'... largely fictions ...':
Aelius Aristides on Plato's
dialogues
Ancient
Narrative 1 (2000-2001), 32-54
This is the full text of the
original publication. The page numbers of the original are indicated
between square brackets. A PDF can be downloaded from the website of
Ancient Narrative, here.
Abstract
Among the
extant works of Aelius Aristides, there are three texts (orr. 2–4) that
answer the attack by Plato's Socrates, in the Gorgias,
on oratory and on the four leading statesmen of fifth-century Athens.
This paper focuses on the constant harping on the
fictional nature of Plato's dialogues
in
these so-called Platonic orations, a portion of the argument
that
is epitomized in the characterization of the dialogues as 'largely
fictions' (or. 3,586). The paper tries
to locate Aristides'
observations on this issue within the tradition of
anti-Platonic polemic, to determine their
relationship to
theorizing on the dialogue form among early-imperial
Platonists,
and to elucidate the functions of this line of reasoning in Aristides'
apologetic strategy. It argues that, for
Aristides, identifying
the dialogues as fictional compositions amounts to
exposing
the dialogue form as a pretence. In addition to clearing the way for
his own apologetic project
and to alerting his audience to the
persuasive force of Plato's use of the dialogue form, Aristides thus
sharpens the contrast between his own way of handling
the dispute
with Plato and the philosopher's polemical methods.
Introduction
The
observation that Plato's dialogues are fictional compositions rather
than
records of actual conversations will come as no shock to students of
ancient
Greek literature, history, or philosophy.
In fact, the characterization
of the
dialogues implied in this observation seems to be generally accepted
among
classical scholars. This consensus is exemplified by the fact
that
two
monographs published during the last decade of the twentieth century,
while
proposing widely diverging views on the value of Plato's dialogues as
evidence
for Socrates' teaching, at least agree on their fictional nature: Socrates,
Ironist and Moral Philosopher by the late Gregory Vlastos
(1991) and
Charles Kahn's Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The
Philosophical Use of a
Literary Form (1996). Kahn, who rejects the notion of a
Socratic period in
Plato's oeuvre and who regards the early and middle dialogues as
nothing more
than stages in 'the gradual unfolding of a literary plan for presenting
his
philosophical views to the general public',[1]
unsurprisingly underlines the fictionality of the Socratic dialogue as
a genre. According to Kahn, Plato's dialogues are exceptional in this
respect
only as far as their effectiveness in conveying the illusion
of reality
is concerned: the 'realistic' historical dialogue created by the
Athenian
philosopher is 'a work of imagination designed to give the impression
of a
record of actual events, like a good historical novel'.[2]
But Vlastos, who thought it possible to distil the philosophy of the
historical Socrates from the early dialogues, did not deny the
imaginary nature
of these texts either; what we are able to reconstruct on the basis of
the
early dialogues is, Vlastos held, 'the philosophy [33] (...) of the
historical
Socrates, recreated by Plato in invented conversations which explore
its
content and exhibit its method'.[3]
While the fictional nature of
Plato's dialogues seems to be beyond discussion, the value of part of
these
texts as evidence for Socrates' philosophy thus remains controversial.
In
addition, the serviceability of the dialogues as evidence for the views
held by
the author himself is the subject of a lively debate. Many Platonic
scholars
nowadays are inclined to favour a non-dogmatic interpretation of the
dialogues;
their approach is characterized not just by a readiness to appreciate
the philosophical
significance of Plato's preference for the dialogue form but by an
outright
refusal to treat Socrates or any other prominent character in a given
dialogue
as the philosopher's spokesman.[4] In other
words, the dialogues may be fictions but the dialogue form
is not. In a fairly recent debate on the Gorgias,
however, Benjamin
Barber described the mood of Plato's dialogues as 'monophony
masquerading as
polyphony',[5] and this rather unfashionable reading
may serve to demonstrate that
consensus on this issue is not imminent.
The present author is qualified
neither to embark upon a discussion of the historical Socrates nor to
participate in a debate about the interpretation of Plato's oeuvre.
Instead,
this contribution will deal with the observations made by the
second-century
Greek orator Aelius Aristides, in his so-called Platonic orations, on
the
fictional nature of Plato's dialogues and on the philosopher's use of
the
dialogue form. My aim is to elucidate the functions of these
observations in
Aristides' apologetic strategy, to locate them within the tradition of
anti-Platonic polemic in Antiquity, and to determine their
relationship to
ancient theorizing on the dialogue form. In other words, this paper
focuses on
the perception of fictionality in Plato's dialogues by an ancient
observer, as well
as on the concepts employed by him in this context.
This is not a wholly unnecessary
undertaking. Whereas we, as moderns, may follow Arnoldo Momigliano in
appreciating the fact that 'the Socratics moved to that zone between
truth and
fiction that is so bewildering to the professional historian',[6]
the mental capability or intellectual readiness of the ancients to do
so is still contested. In a contribution to a recent collection of [34]
articles on
Dio of Prusa, Aldo Brancacci maintains that the ancients usually failed
to
distinguish the historical Socrates from the protagonist of Socratic
literature:
The
distinction between a "historic" Socrates and a "literary"
one, which for moderns represents a difficult historiographic problem,
is
present only in episodic and exceptional form in ancient literature.
[7]
If
the present inquiry succeeds in questioning the validity of this
contention, it
will have served at least one useful purpose. Moreover, it is hoped
that an
investigation into this line of reasoning in Aristides' Platonic
orations will
further our understanding of these curious texts, which together form
'un document sans équivalent dans la
littérature conservée'[8] and which are
so characteristic of their author and of his
socio-political and cultural milieu.
In order to attain this twofold
aim, I shall first introduce Aristides' Platonic orations and briefly
examine
matters of dating. This introductory section is followed by a
discussion of the
apologetic strategy employed by Aristides in his debate with Plato. As
the
orator's observations on the fictional character of Plato's dialogues
and on
the philosopher's use of the dialogue form are inextricably linked with
this
strategy, this discussion is a necessary preliminary to the survey and
analysis
of these observations presented in the next section. Subsequently, we
will turn
to possible sources of inspiration for Aristides' characterization of
Plato's
dialogues as fictional compositions: the tradition of anti-Platonic
polemic and
theorizing on the dialogue form among contemporary Platonists.
Aristides'
apologetic project
Among
the extant works of Aelius Aristides, there are three texts in which
the
Antonine orator makes a stand against the attack by Plato's Socrates,
in the Gorgias,
on oratory and on the four leading statesmen of fifth-century Athens:
Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles. In the edition by Charles
Behr,[9] [35]
these are the second, third, and
fourth orations: To Plato: In
Defence of Oratory, To Plato: In Defence of the Four,
and To Capito
respectively. The titles of the second and third orations speak for
themselves; the fourth oration is, in fact, a letter addressed to an
admirer of
Plato who had taken offence at the way in which Aristides had dealt
with the
philosopher's Sicilian adventures in To Plato:
In Defence of Oratory. To
Capito is, therefore, later than In Defence of
Oratory, and as
Aristides' letter adumbrates a large portion of the argument of In
Defence
of the Four,[10] it is
presumably earlier than the latter work. Capito was probably a
citizen of Pergamum,[11] where
Aristides resided from 145 to 147 in the sanctuary of Asclepius.
Behr has
attempted to fix exact
dates on these orations, assigning In Defence of Oratory
and To
Capito to the years in Pergamum and In Defence of
the Four to the
early 160s.[12] His propositions have not met with
general assent. David Sohlberg has
expressed his disinclination to believe that In Defence of
Oratory was
composed almost two decades before In Defence of the Four,[13]
while Laurent Pernot has labelled Behr's dating of the latter oration
'conjectural'.[14] In
responding to Sohlberg's criticism, Behr appealed to 'the
improbability
of Aristides writing II, IV, and then III with little time
intervening'.[15] At first
sight, the sheer scale of the Platonic orations — more than
400 pages in Behr's edition — lends a certain plausibility to this
observation.
It seems, however, inadvisable to underestimate Aristides' prolificacy.
Moreover, I think that rather than perusing the Platonic orations for
questionable
chronological indications, we should study these texts on the basis of
the
assumption that they are parts of an apologetic project that was
conceived as
one entity. In doing so, we shall follow the lead of the author of a
hypothesis
of In Defence of the Four. This rhetorician —
Sopater according [36]
to
Friedrich Lenz[16] —
characterizes the oration as a deuterologia, a
second speech
for the defence,[17] thus
indicating that, in his opinion, In Defence of Oratory
and
In Defence of the Four should be considered parts of
a whole. The choice
of such a unitarian point of departure is justified to some extent by
the fact
that the line of reasoning on which this paper focuses can be found
throughout
the Platonic orations.
Defending
Hellenism without losing Plato
Confronting
Plato was not an easy task; in fact, it placed Aristides in a
predicament of
frightening proportions. The classical past of Hellas in general and of
Athens
in particular was of inestimable value for the Antonine
orator. It was
the
intellectual and emotional link with this past that constantly
nourished his
self-confidence as a Greek living in a world dominated by
Rome. And it
was
oratory more than anything else that linked the contemporary Greek
world with
the classical past and thus served as the medium par
excellence for the
continual reaffirmation of Hellenic identity. In short, for a
second-century
Greek gentleman and man of letters such as Aristides, the attack by
Plato's
Socrates on oratory and on the four Athenian statesmen could never be a
matter
of indifference given the importance of the classical heritage for his
identity. At
the same time, Plato was also part and parcel of the
Hellenic
heritage, and the biting criticism of Athenian political discourse in
the Gorgias
exemplified the contradictions within the classical tradition.
Consequently, in
vindicating the victims of the attack by Plato's Socrates Aristides ran
the
risk of attacking a cultural icon and of undermining rather than
reinforcing
the integrity of Hellenism.[18]
How does Aristides deal with this
dilemma? In the first place, a considerable portion of his arguments in
defence
of oratory and of the four Athenians is borrowed from Plato's own
writings: he
has scrutinized the philosopher's oeuvre for utterances which are at
odds with
the position in the Gorgias.[19]
This part of his apologetic strategy permits the orator to present
Plato [37]
as his strongest ally rather than his opponent.[20]
By thus turning the plaintiff into a witness for the defence, Aristides
is able to refute the accusations against oratory and the four, while
at the
same time maintaining that he does not mean to give offence to Plato
and to his
admirers:
How
then could someone have good reason to be incensed with us when Plato
himself
confirms the truth of what we say?
[21]
In
the second place, Aristides repeatedly goes out of his way to give
expression
to his respect and admiration for Plato.[22]
The philosopher is literally showered with compliments. The function
of this part of the orator's apologetic strategy is similar to that of
enlisting Plato as a witness for the defence. It can be illustrated by
a
passage from To Capito, where Aristides draws the
attention of the
addressee to the fact that, by taking offence at a small part of the
argument
of In Defence of Oratory, the references to Plato's
Sicilian adventures,
Capito has failed to appreciate the introduction and the katastasis,
the
way in which Aristides has presented the facts of the case. Otherwise,
Capito
would not have missed the consideration and reverence that Aristides
had shown
for Plato.[23] In other words, Aristides' foremost
aim in praising Plato was to avoid
being left empty-handed if confronted with the accusation that he had
not given
the philosopher his due.
Double-edged
compliments
In
this velvet glove, however, there is an iron fist. Apart from some
perfunctory
compliments to Plato's knowledge of things human and divine,[24]
Aristides' praise refers to the philosopher's literary genius: he
consistently extols Plato as [38]
an exceptionally gifted author or, in
Aristides'
words, as an orator.[25] 
Already in
the proem to In Defence of Oratory, it is suggested
that the philosopher was not wholly averse to oratory.[26] Plato is hailed as 'greatest of the Greek tongues'[27],
and accorded a place of honour in the chorus of Greek literature, an
accolade he earns by being 'closest to oratory'.[28]
And in the peroration of the same oration, Aristides proclaims Plato
'the
father and teacher of orators'.[29] The
ultimate tribute, however, comes in the letter To Capito,
where the philosopher is ranked with Demosthenes as Aristides'
personal
favourite.[30]
I certainly do not mean to
suggest that Aristides' admiration for Plato was insincere. The fact
that he
dreamed about being placed on a par with Plato is sufficient proof to
the contrary:[31] if
anywhere, it is in his craving for glory that we should
unhesitatingly trust Aristides. Nevertheless, in expressing
his esteem for the
philosopher in the Platonic orations, the Antonine orator had ulterior
motives.
As we have seen, praising Plato played a defensive role in his
strategy: it was
a way of anticipating the righteous anger of contemporary Platonists
who
might feel offended by Aristides' attempt to refute the Gorgias.
But
while allegedly meant to appease Plato's followers, Aristides'
admiration for
Plato was likely to infuriate them, because it amounted to an attempt
to
appropriate the philosopher as a literary artist. Aristides must have
been
fully aware of this effect, and this gives his praise for Plato a
polemical
edge. This interpretation can be substantiated by a brief
demonstration of
the controversial nature of the literary appreciation of Plato's
oeuvre in the
second- and early third-century cultural scene.[32]
Those who esteemed Plato
primarily as a philosopher were not always all that happy about their
less
philosophically-minded fellow-admirers. Aulus Gellius, for example,
relates
how the Platonic philosopher Calvenus Taurus flew into a rage when
confronted
with a miscreant who read Plato's dialogues in order to improve his
style.[33] The same deplorable habit is heavily
[39] frowned
upon by Plutarch.[34] Apparently,
the literary merit of Plato's work was a mixed blessing for
his philosophically-minded adherents. Calvenus Taurus teases those
members of
his audience, whom he suspects of a primarily rhetorical interest,
with the
grace and splendour of Plato's prose, but at the same time he warns
them
against an aesthetic appreciation of the dialogues.[35]
If we can believe Isidorus of Pelusium, Plutarch went even further by
deploring the alleged impact of Gorgias on Plato's style; thus he
accounted for
the fact that the philosopher's prose had lost the distinctive
characteristics
of genuine Atticism, clarity and simplicity.[36]
Plutarch's complaint reflects debates on the stylistic merits of
Plato's prose, as can be seen from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who
accused
Plato of inappropriate 'Gorgianizing'.[37]
Given that the literary
appreciation of Plato's dialogues was a potential embarrassment for
his
philosophically-minded devotees, it was to be expected that the
oratorical camp
would seize the opportunity by making praise of Plato's literary merits
part of
its polemic.[38] This is what Philostratus does in
his letter to Julia Domna.[39] The Severan
sophist gives Plutarch's criticism of Plato's style a
positive turn: if even the divine Plato emulated Gorgias, Hippias, and
Protagoras, it should be obvious that there is nothing wrong with the
sophists.
This is the background against which we should read Aristides' praise
of Plato,
and I think that it is reasonable to conclude that the addressee of To
Capito must have been less than amused when he was offered,
in reply to his
objections, an encore of such double-edged compliments from In
Defence of
Oratory.[40]
Platonic
fictions
As
far as the fictional nature of Plato's dialogues is concerned,
Aristides comes
straight to the point. In the proem to In Defence of Oratory,
before
quoting the [40]
accusations against oratory made by Plato's Socrates in the
Gorgias,[41] he claims
that Plato contrived a meeting between Socrates and Gorgias
at Athens (Γοργίου καὶ Σωκράτους ὑποθέμενος συνουσίαν Ἀθήνησι) in
order to make his over-contentious statements about oratory.[42]
The use of the verb hypotithesthai does not
necessarily imply
that the meeting is fictitious, but certainly strongly suggests so.
Roos Meijering,
in her study on Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek
Scholia,
concludes from an analysis of the terms hypothesis
and hypotithesthai
that these words do indicate that a poet 'occasionally deviates from
tradition
and reality if it suits him to do so'.[43]
As far as Aristides' usage is concerned, it is relevant that he
employs the verb for Plato's presentation, in the Eighth
Letter
(355a-357d), of the by then dead Dio of Syracuse as a speaking person:[44]
a textbook example of eidōlopoiia and, as such,
obviously a
fictional device.[45] Our
interpretation of the passage under discussion is supported by the
scholiast, who explains to the readers of In Defence of
Oratory what
Aristides meant to say: 'you invented the meeting in order to inveigh
against
oratory'.[46]
The natural implication of
Aristides' assertion that the Gorgias is an account
of a fictional
meeting would be that the conversation between Socrates, Gorgias,
Polus, and
Callicles is also fictitious. For this obvious conclusion to be drawn,
however,
we have to wait until the summary of the argument of In
Defence of the Four.[47] In the
meantime, the orator limits himself to first insinuating and
then claiming that Plato's Socrates is the philosopher's mouthpiece —
a point
which is, of course, central to his apologetic project.
That the Socrates of Plato's
dialogues is their author's spokesman is assumed rather than argued
when
Aristides quotes a statement by the Socra[41]tes of the Gorgias
(469b-c) in
order to elicit an answer from Plato to the question whether the
premise that
it is better to suffer than to do wrong entails the conclusion that
being
wronged is an experience to be welcomed (αἱρετόν). The statement is
introduced as follows:
If
Plato would answer us, it would be of great value for our argument. And
the
answer is at hand. How? In the way in which he has made Socrates
provide an
answer.
[48]
This
explicit formulation of the mouthpiece view is, however, preceded by a
more
subtle discussion of the protagonist of Socratic literature. Aristides
appeals
to the Alcibiades of Aeschines of Sphettos (fr. 11
Dittmar = fr. 53
Giannantoni 1990) in order to find support for his claim that denying
an
activity the status of a technē does not
necessarily imply a
depreciatory judgment.[49] He justifies
the enlistment of Aeschines' help by pointing out that
Aeschines' writings have always been considered highly congenial and
suitable
to Socrates' character, a judgment that has even given rise to the
false
opinion that Aeschines' dialogues are Socrates' own writings.[50]
But in spite of the fact that no writings of Socrates are extant,
Aristides continues, it is possible to make trustworthy statements
about him.
Such statements have to meet the criterion of unanimity among the
Socratics.
Thus, all Socrates' associates agree that he pleaded complete
ignorance, that
he was nonetheless proclaimed the wisest of all men by the Pythia, and
that he
received signs from his daimonion.[51]
It is evident that the
introduction of the criterion of the consensus omnium
Socraticorum as a
touchstone for reliable statements about the historical Socrates is
potentially
very damaging to the trustworthiness of Plato's portrait of
Socrates. In the Defence
of Oratory, however, Aeschines' Socrates is not yet employed
to discredit
Plato's Socrates. All that changes in the Defence of the Four,
where the
orator contrasts with the disparagement of Themistocles in the Gorgias
a
laudatory statement on the Athenian statesman by Aeschines' Socrates,
in the Alcibiades
(fr. 8 Dittmar = fr. 50 Gian[42]nantoni
1990).[52]
Unsurprisingly, Aristides holds that the view ascribed to Socrates by
Aeschines better fits the opinion of the historical Socrates than the
invectives of Plato's Socrates. What is interesting, however, is that
the
orator connects the lack of trustworthiness of Plato's portrait of
Socrates
with the philosopher's superior literary talent.
While the less gifted
Aeschines is supposed to have limited himself to reporting what he had
heard,
or something very close to it, Plato's genius finds
expression in his
ability
to credit Socrates with views that he did not hold and with statements
on
issues in which he is agreed to have had no interest at all.[53]
The link forged by Aristides between Plato's literary genius and the
fictional character of his portrait of Socrates underlines the
double-edged
nature of his praise for Plato as a literary artist.
The contrast between Plato's and
Aeschines' Socrates is resumed in the part of In Defence of
the Four in
which Aristides summarizes his objections against the maltreatment of
the
fifth-century Athenian leaders in the Gorgias.
Again, the complimentary
statements about Themistocles by Aeschines' Socrates (fr. 7 Dittmar =
fr. 49
Giannantoni 1990) are favourably compared to a comment by Plato's
Socrates, in
this case from the Alcibiades I (118b-c), on an
Athenian politician,
namely Pericles.[54] And again,
acknowledgment of Plato's literary genius is very much a
part of the orator's polemic. In this case, however, Aristides does not
confine
his remarks to Plato's Socrates, but broadens his argument to include
the
dialogues as such. For Aristides continues by pointing out that Plato's
superior talent finds expression in the majestic freedom that he
permits
himself, and that this poetic licence is not just a matter of word
choice, but
also applies to his handling of the subject-matter of his dialogues,
the hypotheseis.[55] The
liberties taken by Plato with the historical facts are illustrated
by a discussion of the inconsistencies in the dramatic dates of the Menexenus
and the Symposium,[56]
expand[43]ing
a line of reasoning that had already been introduced at the
end of To Capito.[57]
In the Defence of the Four, the exposure of the
inconsistencies
in the dramatic dates of the dialogues leads to the conclusion that the
dialogues are fictions, plasmata:
But
these incongruities result from the licence that is customary in the
dialogues.
For owing to the fact that they are all largely fictions and that one
is at
liberty to construct the plot using any ingredient one chooses, these
works as
such are not conspicuous for scrupulous preservation of the truth.
[58]
The
term plasma refers to the well-known tripartite
division of narrative
according to its truth-content in history, myth, and plasma.[59]
This division goes back to the hellenistic period[60]
and is reproduced by Sextus Empiricus, among others. Sextus defines plasma
as the narration of things that have not really happened but that are
related
as though they had.[61] The
equivalent term in Latin sources is argumentum,
defined by
Cicero and the Rhetorica ad Herennium as ficta
res, qui tamen fieri
potuit.[62] In other
words, the employment of the term plasma amounts
to a
characterization of Plato's dialogues as realistic fiction. By now
Aristides
has argued at length for the dialogues in general what had been
postulated for
the Gorgias in the proem to In Defence of
Oratory:[63] the meetings
between the interlocutors are fictitious.
Traditionally, the standard
examples of plasmata were comedy and mime.[64]
Appreciation of the liberties taken by tragic poets in adapting their
traditional subject matter resulted in the addition of tragedy, and
this
devel[44]opment
entailed the introduction of the term dramatikon
diēgēma as
an equivalent of plasmatikon diēgēma.[65]
Interestingly, in the Defence of Oratory Aristides
in passing
calls Plato's dialogues dramata,[66]
while the scholiast applauds the designation of the dialogues, in the Defence
of the Four, as plasmata, 'because they
resemble dramata'.[67]
It is certainly tempting to conjecture that in designating the
dialogues
as dramata Aristides is already hinting at their
fictional status.[68]
At any rate, in the Defence of
the Four the classification of the dialogues as plasmata
is
elaborated in an identification of the dialogues with comedy and
tragedy.
Aristides portrays Plato as a man who, despite his objections to
dramatic
poetry, is full of comedy himself[69] as well as a
tragic poet.[70] Playing on the ambiguity of the verb
mimeisthai (meaning both 'to
imitate' and 'to represent'), Aristides accuses Plato of
inconsistency,
because the philosopher does not heed his own warnings against dramatic
representation:[71]
And
while you say that one should not imitate bad men and should not make
oneself
like one's inferiors, you yourself are not very consistent in following
this
precept, but you represent sophists, you represent syco
[45]phants, you
represent
Thrasymachus who never blushed, doorkeepers, children, and countless
others.
[72]
The
consequence of the characterization of the dialogues as dramatic poetry
and, as
such, works of fiction is spelled out when Aristides takes Plato to
task for
the gratuitousness of his attack on the four Athenian statesmen. In the
orator's opinion, it would have been possible for the philosopher to
conclude
the argument without maligning them — just as comedy could do without
ridiculing people by name![73] The possible
objection that the names of Themistocles, Miltiades,
Cimon, and Pericles had been brought up by Callicles (Grg.
503c) is
brushed aside as ludicrous:[74]
For
who does not know that Socrates, Callicles, Gorgias, Polus, all of this
is
Plato, who turns the discussion in whatever direction suits him?
[75]
In
fact, Aristides claims, there was no Callicles to cause trouble for
Plato or to
prevent him from concluding the argument as he wished.[76]
In other words, both the meeting hypothesized in the Gorgias
and
the reported conversation are products of Plato's literary creativity.
And
Aristides' manner of presenting this observation amounts to an exposure
of the
dialogue form as a sham: after all, all
interlocutors are Plato's
puppets.
This implication of the
identification of the dialogues as fictional literary texts was
adumbrated in
the proem to In Defence of Oratory, where the Gorgias
was
characterized as an indictment and the role of Socrates'
interlocutors as
defenders of oratory as a disguise: [46]
For
it would be terrible if he, in undertaking to make his indictment
openly, at
least in a certain sense did not deny oratory its defence, but allowed
two or
three men to oppose, maintaining at least the pretence of a dialogue,
while
we, who are able and intend to help in every way, shall lack the
courage to do
so, as if it would not be allowed to bring in other arguments against
Plato
than the ones that he chose to make against himself.
[77]
It is
here that we touch upon the functions of Aristides' constant harping on
the
fictional character of the dialogues. By pointing out the illusionary
character
of the dialogue form, he alerts his audience to its persuasive force
and clears
the way for his own apologetic project. His praise of Plato's literary
genius
has proven to be more than a way of dealing with the dilemma caused by
his
decision to enter the lists again the philosopher and of sweetening the
pill
for Plato's admirers, who might take offence at his arguments. As it
leads up
to the claim that the dialogues are fictions, it is also a highly
effective
ingredient in his polemic. At the same time, the exposure of the
dialogue as a
literary cover for an indictment adds a polemical dimension to the
other method
used by Aristides to lessen his predicament: borrowing arguments
against Plato
from Plato's own writings. But before this assertion can be
substantiated we
should examine the possible sources of inspiration for Aristides'
observations.
Anti-Platonic
polemic and Platonic theorizing
We
started our inquiry with the observation that the characterization of
Plato's
dialogues as fictional compositions would come as no surprise to modern
read[47]ers.
A concise survey of ancient views will suffice to demonstrate
that the
same should have been true of Aristides' audience.
Plato's contemporaries and Greek
intellectuals of the next generation can hardly have failed to
recognize that
his dialogues were not records of actual conversations. After all, in
Aristotle's Poetics the Socratic dialogue and the
prose mime are
bracketed together as examples of mimetic prose.[78]
Aristotle's concept of mimēsis, elusive as it is,
clearly leaves
room for a positive appreciation of what we would
call fiction: a
representation of reality which does not have to correspond to actual
events,
but which constructs a course of events that reflects universal human
behaviour
and experience.[79] It is,
incidentally, likely that the bracketing of the Socratic
dialogue with the prose mime was primarily motivated by the fact that
both are
also mimetic in the narrower sense in which Aristotle uses the word:[80]
in both genres, the spoken word is directly represented.
In Aristotle's Poetics,
the labelling of Plato's dialogues as mimetic prose does not have a
polemical
edge. Things must have changed, however, in the early Hellenistic
period. With
the vanishing of the last generation that had personal memories of
fifth-century Athens, the fictional character of Plato's dialogues
ceased to be
a self-evident truth. Instead, it became the outcome of biographical
and
literary research, and the results of such scholarly efforts could well
be put
to polemical use. Anecdotes such as the one told by Athenaeus about
Gorgias
and Phaedo, who protest never to have spoken the words that Plato puts
in their
mouths,[81] may originate in this period, and a
pun by
Timo of Phlius on Plato and plattein,
also quoted by Athenaeus,[82] points in
the same direction: in the third
century BC the fictional
character of Plato's dialogues had become an argument in the armoury of
anti-Platonic polemic.
In the second century BC,
Herodicus of Babylon produced one of the most vehement attacks on the
Socratics
written in antiquity, Reply to a Socrates-worshipper
(Πρὸς τὸν
Φιλοσωκράτην). Large extracts of this treatise are supposed
to have been preserved in the books 5 and 11 of Athenaeus' [48] Deipnosophistae.
Although Herodicus' pamphlet is mentioned only once by Athenaeus,[83]
a good case has been made by Karl Schmidt for
the theory that the
attacks on philosophers in general and on Plato in particular in these
books
of the Deipnosophistae were, with few exceptions,
taken from Herodicus.[84] A
characteristic ingredient of Herodicus'
anti-Platonic polemic is his
use of archon lists to expose inconsistencies in the dramatic dates of
the
dialogues.[85]
Already Johannes Geffcken pointed
out that Aristides refers to eponymous archons in his exposure of the
inconsistency in the dramatic date of the Menexenus,[86]
and suggested that the orator's treatment of
this issue might
ultimately stem from Herodicus' pamphlet.[87]
Geffcken may well have been right, the more so
since there are other
rather striking similarities between Aristides' Platonic orations and
the
anti-Platonic polemic in the Deipnosophistae. For
example, Athenaeus
combines a critical discussion of the dramatic date of the Parmenides
with censure of Plato's suggestion that Zeno had been Parmenides'
favourite;[88] in To Capito,
where
Aristides for the first time brings up the
inconsistencies in the dramatic dates of the dialogues,[89]
he takes exception at precisely the same
intimation in the Parmenides.[90]
As Herodicus represented an extremely hostile
tradition of
anti-Platonic polemic, it is nothing less than a provocation that
Aristides
plays this card precisely in his letter to the already offended Capito.
Thus Aristides probably borrowed
the chronological arguments for his claim that the dialogues are
fictional
compositions from a tradition of anti-[49]Platonic
polemic. For the claim
itself,
however, and especially for the exposure of the dialogue form as a
cover for
sustained argument, he may well have drawn on theorizing on the
dialogue by
contemporary Platonists. This becomes manifest if one takes a look at
a
definition of the dialogue prevailing among second-century Platonists.
It is
provided by Albinus, in his introduction to the study of Plato's
dialogues:
[A
dialogue] is nothing else than a text consisting of questions and
answers on
some political or philosophical subject, with proper characterization
of the
persons employed and written in a polished style.
[91]
Almost
the same definition of the dialogue can be found in Diogenes Laertius'
treatment of Plato's writings,[92] and the gist
of these Middle Platonist definitions is reproduced by the
sixth-century author of the anonymous Prolegomena to the
Platonic philosophy, who is also generous enough to
point out that the only difference
between
dialogue, on the one hand, and tragedy and comedy on the other, is that
dialogues are in prose.[93]
Although
there are minor
differences between these three definitions, they are consistent in the
importance they attach to ēthopoiia,
characterization. That ēthopoiia
is a procedure in which fiction has its part, is evident from the
definition that
we find in the Progymnasmata ascribed to
Hermogenes: ēthopoiia
is the representation, through invented speech, of a person's character.[94]
Aelius Theon, who prefers the term prosōpopoiia,[95]
mentions in one and the same breath Homer's
poetry, the dialogues of
Plato and the other [50]
Socratics, and the comedies of Menander as models
of this
art of characterization in ascribed speech.[96]
The central importance of ēthopoiia
in Middle Platonic theorizing on the dialogue would, in itself, have
sufficed
to enable Aristides to maintain that the conversations reported in the
dialogues are invented. More Platonist grist to Aristides' mill could
have been
provided by treatises such as those reproduced by Diogenes Laertius or
preserved on a second-century papyrus. In both cases, Socrates,
Timaeus, the
Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger are taken as Plato's
spokesmen. In
the words of Diogenes Laertius:
His
own views [Plato] expresses through four characters: Socrates, Timaeus,
the
Athenian Stranger, and the Eleatic Stranger.
[97]
Moreover,
characters such as Socrates' interlocutors in the Gorgias
are considered
to have been introduced by Plato as whipping-boys:
In
order to refute false opinions, he introduces characters such as
Thrasymachus,
Callicles, Polus, Gorgias, Protagoras, and besides Hippias, Euthydemus
and the
like.
[98]
This
combination of the mouthpiece view with the whipping-boy interpretation
is, of
course, precisely what Aristides must have had in mind when he wrote
that 'Socrates,
Callicles, Gorgias, Polus, all of this is Plato, turning the discussion
in
whatever direction suits him'.[99] Nor is it
surprising in the light of such
theorizing on the dialogue by
contemporary Platonists that the orator maintains [51] that the
meetings
underlying
the conversations are also fictitious: according to Diogenes Laertius,
it is
Plato who brings the characters on the stage.[100]
We have established that, at the
very least, Aristides could have drawn on theorizing on the dialogue
by contemporary
Platonists. But what was the polemical point of bringing up the
fictional
character of the dialogues if Platonists themselves 'would have
acknowledged
that Plato chose the historical setting for fictional conversations to
suit his
philosophical purposes'?[101] A possible
answer to this question can be
found in the hypothesis that
there were also second-century Platonists who maintained that the
dialogues
were meant to be records of actual historical conversations. Proclus,
in a
fascinating passage of his Commentary on the First Alcibiades,
reports
that some (τινές) have made such an assumption,[102]
and John Dillon has suggested that 'τινές will be the Middle
Platonists.'[103] However,
while Proclus' remark concerns the
dialogues as such, the
evidence adduced by Dillon for his suggestion pertains to the Atlantis
story
and is, therefore, inadmissible in the present context.[104]
The identity of Proclus' τιvές must remain an enigma. In the meantime,
we
should assume that Aristides' characterization of the dialogues as
fictional
compositions would, in itself, not have met with opposition among
contemporary
Platonists.
But perhaps the question raised
in the above paragraph is off the mark. For Aristides, the function of
the line
of reasoning that we have followed in this paper did not depend on the
views of
contemporary Platonists. By characterizing the dialogues as fictional
compositions
and by exposing the dialogue form as a cover for sustained argument the
orator
had sharpened the contrast between his own way of handling the dispute
with
Plato and the philosopher's polemical methods. Whereas Plato had
steered the
discussion in whatever direction suited his argument, Aristides had,
by
borrowing arguments from Plato's own writings, allowed his interlocutor
to
speak for [52]
himself. Whereas Plato had disguised an indictment as a
dialogue,
Aristides had put into practice the principle of Plato's Socrates that
what
matters in a discussion is obtaining agreement from one's interlocutor.[105] He had beaten the philosopher at
his own game
— and still, nobody
could deny that he had given Plato his due.[106]
Notes
[1]
. Kahn
1996, xv.
[2]. Kahn
1996, 35.
[3].
Vlastos 1991, 49.
[4].
See
e.g. Ostenfeld 2000, 211: 'It seems to be a widespread, if not general,
opinion
these days that Plato has no spokesman among the interlocutors of his
dialogues.'
[5].
Barber 1996, 363.
[6].
Momigliano 1993, 46.
[7].
Brancacci 2000, 242f.; cf. Brancacci 1992, 3311.
[8].
Pernot 1993, 316.
[9].
P.
Aelii Aristidis Opera Quae Exstant Omnia. Volumen I Orationes
I-XVI complectens,
Leiden: E.J. Brill 1976-80. Translation with copious annotation: Behr
1986. The
discussion of orr. 2-4 by Boulanger 1923, 210-39
still makes instructive
reading; Pernot 1993 is the best treatment. Sohlberg 1972 and Karadimas
1996
focus on or. 2.
[10].
Cf.
Behr 1986, 479 n. 1: 'This little treatise is the forerunner of The
defense
of the Four, ...'
[11].
See or.
4,5 and 4,22, with Behr 1986, 480 n. 31.
[12].
Or.
2 (145-47 AD): Behr 1968, 54-56 with n. 52; cf. Behr 1986, 449 n. 1. Or.
4 (towards the end of the same period): Behr 1968, 59f. with n. 60; cf.
Behr
1986, 479 n. 1: 'around August 147 AD'. Or. 3
(161-65 AD): Behr 1968,
94f. with n. 2; cf. Behr 1986, 460 n. 1.
[13].
Sohlberg 1972, 178 n. 6.
[14].
Pernot 1993, 316 n. 4.
[15]. Behr
1994, 1165f. n. 117.
[16]. Lenz
1959, 15: 'It is Sopater who speaks to us in H1,
either directly or
through the medium of one of his pupils who set forth the thoughts of
his
teacher writing down his introductory lecture on the oration.'
[17].
H1
158,5-11 Lenz = III 436,2-10 Dindorf.
[18].
For
Aristides' phrasing of his dilemma see e.g. or.
3,129f.; cf. Pernot
1993, 330f.; De Lacy 1968, 10.
[19]. Cf.
Boulanger 1923, 212; De Lacy 1968, 10; Trapp 1990, 166f.; Pernot 1993,
325-328.
[20].
See
e.g. or. 2,462 and or. 4,8.
[21].
Or.
3,568: πῶς
οὖν ἄν τις νεμεσῴη δικαίως ἡμῖν, ὅταν αὐτὸς Πλάτων ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγομεν
ἐπιψηφίζῃ;
[22].
See
De Lacy 1968, 10; Sohlberg 1972, 256-259; Pernot 1993, 323.
[23].
Or.
4,22f.: οὕτω πᾶσαν αἰδῶ καὶ
τιμὴν ἀπεδώκαμεν αὐτῷ, ὥστε εἰ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν ἔμελλεν ἀντερεῖν, οὐκ
ἄν μοι
δοκοίη μᾶλλον αὑτοῦ φείσασθαι.
[24].
See
e.g. or. 3,461: ... ὁ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων
πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμων, προσθήσω δὲ καὶ τῶν θείων ... I
think that Sohlberg 1972, 259 overvalues utterances such as these by
stating 'dass
es nicht nur der Stilist Platon ist, dem Aristides Anerkennung, ja im
gewissen
Sinne Verehrung entgegenbringt'.
[25].
See
Walsdorff 1927, 89: 'Dennoch schätzt er auch Platon vor allem als
Redner.'
[26].
Or.
2,15.
[27].
Or.
2,72: ὦ μέγιστη σὺ
γλῶττα τῶν Ἑλληνίδων — quoting Cratinus (fr. 293 Kock)
on Pericles (cf. or. 3,51).
[28].
Or. 2,427f.
[29]. Or.
2,465: ... τὸν τῶν ῥητόρων πατέρα καὶ διδάσκαλον ...
[30]. Or.
4,6; cf. or. 3,508.
[31]. Or.
51,58.
[32]. The
next paragraph draws on Hahn 1989, 86-88; see also Holford-Strevens
1988, 67
with n. 34; Schmitz 1997, 87-89.
[33]. Gell.
NA 1,9,10.
[34].
De
profectibus in virtute, Mor. 79d.
[35]. Gell.
NA 17,20,4-6; cf. the comments by Lakmann 1995,
168-177.
[36].
Plu.
fr. 186 Sandbach = Isid. Pel. Ep. 2,42.
[37]. D.H. Dem.
5f.; cf. Walsdorff 1927, 9-15 and 85.
[38]. Cf.
Geffcken 1929, 105: 'Die Verteidigung Platons als Stilisten hatte, weil
sie
zugleich ein Angriff war, erheblichen Erfolg' [italics added].
[39]. Ep.
73; cf. Penella 1979, esp. 164f.; see also Flinterman 1995, 32;
Flinterman
1997, esp. 81f.; and on the Severan empress as a patroness of
literature and
learning Hemelrijk 1999, 122-126.
[40].
Or.
4,26, quoting or. 2,428 and 465; cf. above, n. 28
and 29.
[41]. Or.
2,22 = Pl. Grg. 463a-465c.
[42]. Or.
2,13.
[43].
Meijering 1987, 133.
[44].
Or.
2,321 and esp. 324: ... ὁ
Δίων αὐτῷ τετελευτηκὼς ὑπόκειται λέγων ὡς ἔμπνους ...
[45].
In
the passages mentioned in the preceding note Aristides compares his own
introduction of the four Athenian statesmen as speaking characters to
Plato's
presentation of Dio in the Eighth Letter. The same
device is employed by
him at greater length in or. 3,365-400. The latter
case is mentioned as
an example of εἰδωλοποιία by [Hermog.] Prog. 9 (=
20,14-18 Rabe)
and Aphth., Prog. 11 (= 44,28-45,1 Spengel). The
remark of the scholiast
at or. 3.365 about τὴν
ἠθοποιίαν τὴν
θρυλλουμένην (III 671,6-7 Dindorf) does not refer to
Plato's
art of characterization (as Ausland 1997, 376 n. 13 thinks) but bears
witness
to the fame of this passage from In Defence of the Four
in later
antiquity.
[46].
Σ
Aristid. III
363,13-14 Dindorf: διὰ
τοῦτο ἐπλάσο
τὴν συνουσίαν, ἵνα χωρήσῃς κατὰ ῥητορικῆς.
[47].
See
below, text to nn. 74 and 75.
[48].
Or.
2,262: οὐκοῦν
εἰ Πλάτων
αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ἀποκρίναιτο, πλείστου γένοιτ'
ἂν ἄξιον τῷ λόγῷ. ὑπάρχει δὲ καὶ τοῦτο. πῶς; ὡς αὐτῷ Σωκράτης
ἀποκρινομένος πεποίηται. Cf. the remark on the Apology
in or. 28,82 Keil.
[49].
Or.
2,61-65.
[50].
Or.
2,77; for the false opinion see e.g. D.L. 2,60; cf. Döring 1979, 68
with n. 90.
[51].
Or.
2,78-79.
[52].
Or.
3,348-351; cf. Tarrant 2000, 132.
[53].
Or.
3,351: ..., ὁ
δὲ τῆς φύσεως οἶμαι κέχρηται τῇ περιουσίᾳ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλα μυρία δήπου
διεξέρχεται ἐπὶ τῷ Σωκράτους ὀνόματι, περὶ ὧν ὁμολογεῖται μηδὲν ἐκεῖνον
πραγματεύεσθαι. Cf. S.E. M. 7,9f. = Timo
of Phlius fr.
62 Di Marco = Supplementum Hellenisticum 836:
ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων
αιτιᾶται τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπὶ τῷ οὕτω καλλωπίζειν τὸν Σωκράτην πολλοῖς
μαθήμασι·
"ἢ γάρ" φησι "τὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μεῖναι ἠθολόγον." I owe this reference
to Rein Ferwerda.
[54].
Or.
3,575: ... ὅ
γε ἐκείνου (i.e. Aeschines')
Σωκράτης οὐ τὴν
αὐτὴν ἐτράπετο.
[55].
Or.
3,577.
[56].
Or.
3,577ff.
[57].
Or.
4,50f.
[58].
Or.
3,586: ἀλλ'
ἐστὶν ταῦτα
ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν διαλόγων ἐξουσίας καὶ συνηθείας ὡρμημένα. τῷ γὰρ ἅπαντας
αὐτοὺς
ἐπιεικῶς εἶναι πλάσματα καὶ πλέκειν ἐξεῖναι δι' ὧν ἄν τις βούληται,
ἔνεστίν τι
κἀν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτοῖς οὺ σφόδρα τηροῦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
[59].
On
this classification see Barwick 1928; Meijering 1987, 76-90.
[60].
Pace
Hose 1996, who advances the hypothesis that the division originated in
late
republican Rome; Erler 1997 argues that it ultimately stems from Plato
himself.
[61].
S.E. M.
1,263: ... πλάσμα
δὲ πραγμάτων
μὴ γενομένων μὲν ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς γενόμενοις λεγομένων (sc. ἔκθεσις
ἐστιν), ...;
cf. M. 1,252.
[62].
Cic.,
Inv. 1,27; Rhetorica ad Herennium
1,13.
[63].
Or.
2,13; see above, text to nn. 42-46.
[64].
S.E. M.
1,263: ...,
ὡς αἱ κωμικαὶ ὑποθέσεις καὶ οἱ μῖμοι. Cf. M.
1,252; Rhetorica ad Herennium 1,13.
[65].
On
this development see Meijering 1987, 87-90, with e.g. [Herm.], Prog.
2
(= 4,17f. Rabe): ...
τὸ δὲ πλασματικόν, ὃ καὶ δραματικὸν καλοῦσιν, οἷα τὰ τῶν τραγικῶν.
[66].
Or.
2,164: ... ἐν
ἄλλοις τισὶ δράμασι ἢ λόγοις ...
[67].
Οr. 3,586, quoted above (n. 58);
Σ Aristid.
III
716,31-34 Dindorf:
καλὸν τὸ πλάσματα· ἐοίκασι γὰρ οἱ διάλογοι δράμασι, διὰ τὸ ἔχειν καὶ
αὐτοὺς οἱαδηποτοῦν πρόσωπα, καὶ λόγούς περικεῖσθαι, οὓς δοκεῖ τῷ
Πλάτωνι.
[68].
In
this connection, we should note the juxtaposition, in the mosaic floor
in the
triclinium of the House of Menander at Mytilene, of a panel
representing
Socrates, Simmias, and Cebes, the chief interlocutors in Plato's Phaedo,
with eight panels showing scenes from Menanders comedies and one
portraying the
comic poet himself. See Charitonidis/Kahil/Ginouvès 1970, 33-36 and,
for the
date (third quarter of the third century AD) of the mosaic floor, 12. I
owe
this reference to Heinz Hofmann. At Rome Plato's dialogues were staged
as
diversions during drinking-bouts, see Plu. Quaestiones
convivales, Mor.
711b-d; cf. Lakmann 2000 (non vidi).
[69].
Or.
3,614: ἀλλ'
αὐτὸν τὸν
Ἀριστοφάνη τίς ἔσθ' ὁ κωμῳδῶν; ὅτῳ πολὺ τῆς κωμῳδίας, φαίη τις ἄν,
περίεστιν. The comic representation of Aristophanes to
which Aristides takes exception,
can be found in Smp. 185c, see or.
3,579 and 581; or.
4,50; and cf. Ath. 187c.
[70].
Or.
3,615, taking the Athenian Stranger as Plato's double and the
self-designation
in Lg. 817b literally.
[71].
Pl., R.
394e-396e.
[72].
Or.
3,616:
καὶ λέγεις ὡς μὲν οὐ χρὴ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς φαύλους οὐδ' ἀφομοιοῦν αὑτὸν
τοῖς
χείροσι, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐ πανὺ χρῇ τούτῳ διὰ τέλους, ἀλλὰ μιμῇ σοφιστάς.
μιμῇ
συκοφάντας, μιμῇ Θρασύμαχον τὸν οὐδεπώποτε ἐρυθριάσαντα, θυρωρούς,
παιδία,
μυρίους. The same accusation can be found in Ath. 505b.
[73].
Or.
3,631; cf. or. 3,8.
[74].
Or.
3,632: ὅπου
γ' εἰ καὶ ὁ
Καλλικλῆς ἔτυχεν περὶ αὐτῶν ὑπολαβών, ἔστι μὲν οἶμαι γέλως πᾶν τοῦτο.
[75].
Or.
3,632: τίς
γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς καὶ ὁ Γοργίας καὶ ὁ
Πώλος πάντα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν Πλάτων, πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ τρέπων τούς λόγους.
Cf.
the scholium ad loc. (Σ Aristid. III 724,8 Dindorf): πάντα
ἐμφαίνει πλάσματα.
[76].
Or.
3,640: καὶ
οὐδεὶς αὐτὸν ὁ Καλλικλῆς παρὼν ἐτάραττεν, οὐδ' ἐκώλυεν τὸ μὴ ὅπως
βούλεται περαίνειν τὀν λόγον.
[77].
Or.
2,14: καὶ
γὰρ ἂν εἴη δεινόν, εἰ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὑποστὰς κατηγορεῖν ἐκ προφανοῦς οὐκ
ἀπεστέρησεν τρόπον γέ τιν' αὐτὴν τῶν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς λόγων, ἀλλ' ἀπέδωκεν
δυσὶν καὶ
τρισὶν ἀντειπεῖν, ὡς γοῦν ἐν σχήματι διαλόγων, ἡμεῖς δὲ οἱ τὸ ὅλον
βοηθεῖν
ἔχοντες καὶ προῃρημένοι μὴ τολμήσομεν, ὥσπερ τοσαῦτ' ἀντιλέγειν Πλάτωνι
δέον,
ὁπόσα ἂν αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν βουληθείη. Incidentally, Aristides
labels the attack on oratory in the Gorgias
sometimes a κατηγoρία,
sometimes a ψόγoς, an invective, see e.g. or.
2,15. Accordingly, his own Defence
of Oratory vacillates between an apology and an encomium. The
same is true
of In Defence of the Four, which goes a long way to
explain the
difficulties experienced by Sopater in pigeonholing the latter oration
as
either forensic or encomiastic, H1 158,13-162,6
Lenz = III
436,12-437,33 Dindorf.
[78].
Arist. Po. 1447a28-b11. On the tradition that Plato
was indebted to
Sophron see Haslam 1972; Clay 1994, 33-37.
[79].
See
Halliwell 1986, 132f.; Rösler 1980, 309-311.
[80].
Po.
1460a5-8; cf. Halliwell 1986, 126-131; Haslam 1972, 22.
[81].
Ath.
505d-e = Swift Riginos 1976, anecdotes 37 and 58.
[82].
Ath.
505e = fr. 19 Di Marco = Supplementum Hellenisticum
793: ὡς
ἀνέπλαττε Πλάτων
ὁ πεπλασμένα θαύματα εἰδώς.
[83].
Ath.
215f: ὡς
ἱστορεῖ ὁ
Ἡρόδικος ὁ Κρατήτειος ἐν τοῖς πρός τόν Φιλοσωκράτην. In
addition, Athenaeus twice refers to Herodicus without mentioning a
title. In 192b
a comparison of the convivial customs of the Homeric heroes with the
proceedings
during the symposia described by Plato, Xenophon, and Epicurus (Ath.
186d ff.),
presumably derived from a treatise Περὶ
συμποσίων, is rounded off with a quotation
from Herodicus; in 219c Herodicus is cited as the source for a poem,
allegedly
by Aspasia, portraying Socrates as chasing after Alcibiades instead of
the
other way round.
[84].
Schmidt 1886. Schmidt was followed by Düring 1941, an edition with
commentary
of Herodicus' fragments; see also Geffcken 1929, 98-101, esp. 99 n. 1,
and now
Trapp 2000, 359f.
[85].
Ath.
217a-218e.
[86].
Or.
3.577f.; cf. above, text to n. 56.
[87].
Geffcken 1929, 106 n. 12: '..., so kann hier Herodicus vorliegen.'
Düring 1941
prints or. 3,577-582 as fragments from Herodicus'
Πρὸς
τὸν Φιλοσωκράτην.
[88].
Ath.
505f, referring to Prm. 127b.
[89].
Or.
4,50f.; cf. above, text to n. 57.
[90].
Or.
4,37; note also the parallels mentioned above, nn. 69 and 72.
[91].
Alb. Intr.
147,17-21 Hermann (the pagination of Hermann's edition is reproduced in
the
edition by Nüsser 1991): ἔστιν
τοίνυν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ λόγος ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ
ἀποκρίσεως συγκείμενος <περὶ> τινος τῶν πολιτικῶν καἰ
φιλοσόφων
πραγμάτων, μετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης ἠθοποιίας τῶν παραλαμβανομένων προσώπων
καὶ τῆς
κατὰ τὴν λέξιν κατασκευῆς.
[92].
D.L.
3,48.
[93].
14,4-10 Westerink 1990.
[94].
[Hermog.] Prog. 9 = 20,7-9 Rabe: Ἠθοποιία
ἐστὶ
μίμησις ἤθους ὑποκειμένου προσώπου, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λὁγους
Ἀνδρομάχη ἐπὶ
Ἕκτορι. The element of invented speech is explicitly
mentioned
when the author explains what is, in his view, the difference between
ἠθοποιία and πρoσωπoπoιία (20,13f. Rabe): ἐκεῖ
γὰρ μὲν ὄντος προσώπου λόγους πλάττομεν, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ
ὂν πρόσωπον πλάττομεν.
[95].
Theon, Prog. 10 = 115,11ff. Spengel.
[96].
Theon, Prog. 2 = 68,21-24 Spengel.
[97].
D.L.
3,52: καὶ
περὶ μὲν τῶν αυτῷ δοκούντων ἀποφαίνεται διὰ τεττάρων προσώπων,
Σωκράτους, Τιμαίου, τοῦ Ἀθηναίου ξένου, τοῦ Ἐλεάτου ξένου. The version
of the mouthpiece view found in
the papyrus (P. Oxy.
3219 fr. 2 col. i) is different from Diogenes Laertius' in
that the
former
accepts without further ado what is denied by the latter: that the
Eleatic
Stranger is Parmenides and the Athenian Stranger Plato; cf. Tarrant
2000,
27-29. As we have seen above (or. 3,615, mentioned
in n. 70), Aristides
implicitly endorses the view expounded in the papyrus.
[98].
D.L.
3,52: περὶ
δὲ τῶν ψευδῶν ἐλεγχομένους εἰσάγει οἷον Θρασύμαχον καὶ Καλλικλέα καὶ
Πώλον Γοργίαν τε καὶ Πρωταγόραν, ἔτι τ' Ἱππίαν καὶ Εὐθύδημον καὶ δὴ καὶ
τοὺς
ὁμοίους.
[99].
Or.
4,632 (quoted above, n. 75).
[100]. Εἰσάγει (D.L. 3,52) is the crucial
word, see Mansfeld
1994, 80 n. 134; cf.
Orig. Cels. 1,28 about the introduction by Celsus
of a Jew as an
anti-Christian polemicist (Ἐπεὶ
δὲ καὶ προσωποποιεῖ [...] καὶ εἰσάγει Ἰουδαῖον πρὸς
τὸν Ἰησοῦν λέγοντά τινα μειρακιωδῶς καὶ οὐδὲν φιλοσόφου πολιᾶς ἄξιον),
with Andresen 1981, 339f.
[101].
Tarrant 2000, 9.
[102].
Procl. in Alc. 18,15-19,2 Segonds 1985.
[103].
Dillon 1973, 232.
[104].
Dillon 1973, 294f., referring to Procl. in Tim.
75,30ff. Diehl; cf.
Tarrant 2000, 54f. with 225 n. 5, where it is suggested that ἱστορία
ψιλή (the characterization of the Atlantis story attributed to Crantor
by
Proclus) 'signifies a bare narrative rather than unadulturated history
in our
sense'.
[105]. Grg.
471e-472c; cf. Karadimas 1996, 163. This passage from the Gorgias
is
paraphrased in or. 3,643.
[106]. The
groundwork for this paper was done during a stay at Oxford in the
spring of
1997 as a visiting scholar of Corpus
Christi College, made possible by the
College's φιλoξεvία and by grants from the Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research
(NWO) and from the Faculty of Arts of Utrecht University. Previous
versions
were given in the Seminar Room of Corpus Christi College, at a
colloquium
occasioned by a visit of Suzanne Saïd to the Department of Ancient
History and
Classical Culture of Utrecht University, and at ICAN 2000. Those
present at
these occasions have been extremely generous in providing me with
comments,
criticisms, and helpful suggestions. Some of the debts incurred along
the way
have been acknowledged in the above footnotes. Thanks are also due to
Ewen
Bowie and Simon R. Slings for repeatedly
allowing me to draw on their
scholarly
expertise. The sole responsibility for any shortcomings or factual
errors is,
of course, mine.
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